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Introduction 
 
1. This document reports on the consultation exercise held between 9 September 
2008 and 4 December 2008 on the document entitled ‘biometric technologies 
in schools: draft guidance for education authorities’ (the draft guidance).  
The draft guidance can be found on the Scottish Government’s website. 
 
2. The draft guidance, aimed primarily at education authorities, head teachers and 
their staff and parent councils, is intended to provide some of the basic 
information about biometric technology and its potential use within schools and 
some of the issues to be carefully considered by education authorities and 
schools before electing to put in place a biometric system.  It also seeks to 
provide some guidance as to good practice in implementing biometric systems 
within schools. 
 
3. This report also sets out what impact the consultation findings will have on the 
draft guidance. 
 
4. Along with the responses to the consultation, the Scottish Government will be 
considering the opinions of the Principles Expert Group which was established 
to help public bodies protect individuals' privacy and to help increase public 
confidence in IT-enabled public services.  The group will advise the Scottish 
Government on high level principles on identity assurance and privacy for 
public services which are enabled by IT. Members of this group have provided 
advice on the draft guidance.  As part of the two objectives, i.e. developing draft 
principles and giving advice on the Biometrics Guidance, the group is 
considering appropriate uses of biometric and other technologies in relation to 
public services in Scotland. 
 
5. As part of that, the members of this group have been considering the practical 
implications of the principles in relation to existing and new systems, covering 
professional and practioner roles, staff procedures and protocols, monitoring 
and audit and governance. 
  
6. We received a wide range of responses to this consultation.  While not all of  
these are mentioned explicitly in this report, we have carefully considered all 
responses.  The sample views in the report have been included to give a 
flavour of the opinions expressed. 
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Background 
 
7. Ministers decided that guidance was needed to provide education authorities, 
schools and parent councils with information about biometric technology, its 
potential use within schools and the issues to be considered before electing to 
use a biometric system after it was brought to the attention of the Scottish 
Government that systems were already in use in some schools. 
 
8. When Fiona Hyslop, Cabinet Secretary for Education and Lifelong Learning 
launched the draft guidance on 9 September 2008, she said: 
 
“We know that some schools are already using biometric 
technology to provide access to school meals and other functions.  
Security and privacy issues are a very serious concern in relation to 
the use of biometrics in schools and this must be fully addressed.  
That is why we are issuing this draft guidance today.  It will be an 
important tool to assist schools, with the involvement of parents and 
pupils, in ensuring this. 
 
The draft guidance will be consulted upon over the next three 
months and then issued in a finalised form taking account of the 
responses received and advice from the expert group. 
 
This Government is committed to putting civil liberties at the heart 
of public services policy.  It is important that schools pupils are 
made aware of the importance of their personal information in 
relation to any biometric service for school meals or library access.  
When using IT, we need to ensure the mechanisms involved are 
designed and delivered in such a way that individual privacy is 
respected.  That is why we are developing principles to guide public 
bodies when designing or developing public service systems and 
why consultation on how we manage biometric technology in 
schools is very important.” 
 
9. We received 24 responses to the consultation from a range of consultees 
including 14 out of the 32 Scottish local authorities.  All published consultation 
responses can be viewed on the Scottish Government’s website. 
 
10. The responses to the consultation and the advice of the Principles Expert 
Group generated a variety of views which have been essential in informing 
potential amendments to the draft guidance.  We would like to thank all those 
who took part in the consultation process for their views. 
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Consultation Report 
 
 
Part 1: Comments on the Draft Guidance 
 
General feedback on the draft guidance document 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “The draft guidance provided is full and comprehensive in its assessment 
of the issues and the advice it provides within each section”. (East 
Ayrshire Council) 
 
• “On the whole the document is neutral and objective and leaves the final 
decision to the local authority and/or school.  It presents clear examples of 
for and against.” (The Moray Council) 
 
• “Overall the draft guidance is a good and balanced document that 
addresses well the areas that education authorities should consider when 
deciding whether to make use of biometric technology”. (No2ID) 
 
11. Comments on the general content of the draft guidance were typically 
supportive. 
 
12. Eleven local authorities responded to the consultation with their own comments 
on the draft guidance (as opposed to comments submitted to them on behalf of 
schools, parent councils and individuals from within their authority area).  
Seven offered general feedback on the document as a whole, describing it as 
‘clear’, ‘full and comprehensive’, ‘unbiased’, ‘balanced’ and ‘helpful’.  
 
13. Another three local authorities responded to the consultation by offering an 
analysis of responses to the guidance which had been submitted to them by 
individuals, schools and other stakeholders from within their authority area.  
Two of these analyses (those from City of Edinburgh Council and Perth and 
Kinross Council) have been published on the Scottish Government’s website 
along with all other responses to the consultation.  One authority requested  
that its submission not be made publicly available. 
 
14. Of the other responses received to the consultation, there are five which 
comment directly on the content of the draft guidance while a further five offer 
more general comments on the potential use of biometric technologies. 
 
15. Members of the Expert Group also commented on the draft guidance document 
and made submissions individually.  These submissions, though not published 
on the Scottish Government website, will also contribute towards any revision 
of the draft guidance. 
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Biometric Technologies in Schools 
Guidance for Education Authorities 
 
Section 1. Introduction 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “The guidance neatly directs authorities to consider whether biometrics is 
the right solution to the problem trying to be solved.” (Aberdeenshire 
Council) 
 
• “It would be useful if the introduction clearly specified the potential uses of 
biometric technologies in schools.” (Dundee City Council) 
 
• “Section 1.2 States clearly that the use of biometric systems in schools is 
a decision for education authorities to make. It informs authorities of good 
practice to be followed in implementing such systems. It asks if there is an 
identified need for such technologies and lists as key issues, the question 
of consent by users and their parents including the right to opt out without 
penalties” (Wester Cleddens Primary School, School Board) 
 
16. The Introduction of the draft guidance explains who it is primarily aimed  
at, where the decisions to implement a biometric system rest and what other 
guidance is available.  It also  mentions some of the issues which are to be 
discussed within the document such as the question of consent and the right  
to opt out. 
 
17. Eight responses made specific comments on the issues outlined in the 
introduction of the draft guidance.  One respondent was concerned that the use 
of the term “good practice” in paragraph 1.1 indicated an assumption that these 
technologies would be used in schools.  As already noted, it is the case that 
biometric technologies are being used in Scottish schools and that is why we 
have produced the guidance.  Conversely, another respondent commented that 
the recognition that “some Scottish schools – like schools around the world – 
will be considering using biometric systems” as “welcome”. 
 
18. There was a suggestion in one response that a list of potential uses of 
biometric technologies within schools should be included in the introduction of 
the guidance.  Examples of the use of biometric technologies in schools are 
given in section 4.1 on page 4 of the draft guidance.  It is not an exhaustive list 
and further uses may emerge in time. 
 
19. Another response indicated that it was helpful that the guidance emphasised 
early on that any decision on the implementation of biometric systems in 
schools was a decision for the education authority.  Other responses, however, 
raised concerns about the fact that this decision is one for education authorities 
to make.  One respondent suggested that “it would be preferable if the good 
practice contained within [the draft guidance] were to be placed on a statutory 
footing rather than being left at the discretion of education authorities.”  Another 
considered that “there is compelling need to consider the matter within the 
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Scottish Parliament, particularly to consider wider issues of civil liberties and to 
consider giving national effect to the “opt out” principal”. 
 
20. These concerns, while certainly pertinent to any debate surrounding the use of 
biometric systems, focus on legislation rather than how existing legislation and 
good practice is expressed in guidance. 
 
Section 2. What is Biometric technology? 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “While paragraph 2.1 identifies some measures that can be used, it must 
also be recognised, that other measures, such as DNA or body odour 
recognition may also be used.” (EIS) 
 
• “The guidance is clear and concise in its description of the technology and 
the type of systems that exist.  During the description of the technology, 
the guidance does well to take the opportunity to raise the question of 
proportionality once again and directs authorities to ask themselves the 
question on whether this is the right use of technology to solve an 
education establishment problem.” (Aberdeenshire Council) 
 
21. This section of the draft guidance covers what is meant by biometric 
technology; the administration of these technologies; approaches to recording 
biometric information and the reverse engineering of images from stored, 
encrypted, numeric data. 
 
22. A number of the comments on this section of the guidance were concerned with 
the last of these issues, pointing out that there is “debate by experts as to 
whether, in fact, this [the reverse engineering of images] might be possible in 
the future, and perhaps this view needs to be included in the document with a 
reassurance that a watching brief on emerging developments regarding 
fingerprint and palm recognition would be maintained, and by whom.” 
 
23. Other respondents expressed similar concerns about the wording of paragraph 
2.3 of the draft guidance.  One respondent pointed out that “Allegedly foolproof 
encryption strategies may prove to be anything but, and we would welcome 
clarification in the guidelines as to whether the numberstrings and/or algorithms 
into which a biometric is converted could ever itself be used to identify an 
individual independently of the system-in-use within a given school.” 
 
24. This respondent also suggested questions that should be considered before 
electing to use biometric technologies within a school such as: “What would 
happen if the technology broke down?”, “Will data be backed up in another 
place – which, if so, suggests that data is electronically transferrable – or will 
pupils simply be required/asked to re-register if the first finger or palmprint they 
gave becomes unusable?” “Will the numberstrings into which the biometric 
identifiers are converted ever be stored on – easily mislaid – CDs or 
flashdrives?” Also, “Will any local authority ever have remote access to the 
computers on which encrypted biometric data is stored?” 
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25. Another response asserted that “contrary to vendors’ claims, it is possible to 
reconstruct images from stored templates” and that there is “widespread 
published literature on methods for reconstructing images from templates.”  
Furthermore, it claimed that “it is not actually necessary to reconstruct original 
images for the privacy of subjects to be invaded.” and that “Someone 
attempting to match a print to a child could identify the child by running the print 
through the enrolment algorithm to generate a template.  Comparing the 
generated template with those stored in the database would yield a match with 
the person to whom the print belonged.” 
 
26. The possibility of the type of situation described above occurring, while 
impossible to eliminate entirely, can be diminished.  The draft guidance states 
in paragraph 8.1 that one of the considerations to be made before electing to 
install a biometric system is whether a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) has 
been conducted.  In conducting a PIA, aspects of any project under 
consideration would include design issues and the identification of ways in 
which negative impacts on privacy can be avoided. 
 
27. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) state in their response to the 
consultation that “In considering the introduction of biometric systems, the ICO 
would encourage the use of the check-list provided within the consultation 
paper to assist in justifying the decision.  Moreover, the ICO is particularly 
pleased to see the emphasis placed on carrying out a Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA) prior to the introduction of a biometric system. PIAs are an 
excellent tool in identifying potential privacy costs and benefits and formulating 
strategies to address problems at the outset of policy development as it is much 
more costly to try to address negative privacy impact after implementation.  The 
ICO would be happy to work with any education authority considering 
introducing biometric technologies in its schools.” 
 
28. On the issue of the reconstructing of images from encrypted numeric data, the 
ICO state that “The obvious benefit of a derived numeric is its resistance to 
reverse engineering for nefarious use” and that “this system is less intrusive 
and is more secure”.  They make the recommendation that “converting data 
into a numerical value is the only system used.” 
 
29. A response which was received from a software company claims that if the 
unencryption of an algorithm were possible, “the unencrypted algorithm can 
match one of many thousands of other algorithms.  An algorithm is not unique, 
and is only of use when compared against the same finger being used in 
another application.”  In the same response the point is made that “Should 
anyone wish to capture biometric data from an individual they need only to 
procure a glass that the individual has held, and they have a permanent record 
of someone’s biometric.” 
 
30. This, of course, is a statement of the approach of this one particular company 
and does not negate the importance of attention to the seventh data protection 
principal as also indicated in paragraph 73. 
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31. There is clearly a concern about the statement in paragraph 2.3 of the draft 
guidance that biometric information “cannot be reconstructed from the data”.  
We will reconsider the wording of 2.3 when redrafting the guidance. 
 
Biometric technology systems 
 
Section 3. School fingerprint or palm recognition systems 
 
Sample responses 
 
• “Hygiene concerns arise from having every child in a class/school 
touching the same piece of plastic or glass. This is of particular concern 
when children use biometric payment systems and touch the equipment 
immediately prior to eating.” (No2ID) 
 
• “What are we saying to our young people when we are scanning their 
palms, fingerprints and not trusting them to handle money??” (Jackie 
Marshall) 
 
• “The practice of fingerprinting is inevitably linked with criminal activity and 
can therefore be seen as stigmatising those having their fingerprints 
taken.” (Information Commissioner’s Office) 
 
32. Section 3 of the draft guidance gives a detailed outline of how biometric 
systems – which measure biometric data from fingerprints or palm vein patterns 
– generate numerical values which are stored in a database and then matched 
against a number generated on each repeated use to identify pupils. 
 
33. There were many comments from respondents concerning the use of 
fingerprint and palm vein pattern recognition systems and there was also 
substantial coverage of this issue in the submissions received from the 
members of the Principles Expert Group.  These comments addressed issues 
such as  “what is perceived by parents to be the conditioning of children to 
accept being fingerprinted as a routine part of life”; hygiene concerns that “arise 
from having every child in a class/school touching the same piece of glass.”; 
that “There is something quite sinister about palm scanning and finger print 
scanning”; and that “fingerprinting - has, an image traditionally and still 
associated with policing and criminal justice.” 
 
34. We are not convinced that issues of hygiene need to be covered in the 
guidance as similar issues affect the use of systems which do not use biometric 
technology.  Most of the comments on these technologies are statements of 
opinion on the suitability of any such systems for use within the school 
environment. 
 
35. The emphasis on the proportionality and suitability of any biometric system is 
consistent throughout the draft guidance, as respondents to the consultation 
indicated:  
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• “During the description of the technology, the guidance does well to take 
the opportunity to raise the question of proportionality once again and 
directs authorities to ask themselves the questions on whether this is the 
right use of technology to solve an education establishment problem“ 
(Aberdeenshire Council)  
 
• “Para 1.2 of the guidelines raises the question of whether or not 
biometrics are a proportionate response to an identified problem within a 
school, and whether or not there may be other solutions.” (The University 
of Strathclyde) 
 
36. This is emphasised in paragraph 8.1 in particular, where a checklist of 
considerations is presented along with the advice that “An important question to 
be addressed when considering the installation of a biometric system is 
whether there is an identified need for this type of technology and its potential 
impact for data subjects”.  Education authorities should consider suitability 
during their deliberations.  Ultimately, however, these decisions are for 
education authorities to make. 
 
37. In light of the number of responses received to the consultation questioning the 
proportionality of implementing biometric systems in schools, we will consider 
whether it is necessary to make this clearer still in the revised guidance. 
 
38. Further discussion around the opinions expressed in the consultation on 
aspects of fingerprint and palm vein pattern recognition systems, along with 
discussion of other comments received which don’t directly engage with the 
content or wording of the guidance, are in Part 2 of this report. 
 
Section 4. Examples of the use of biometric technology in schools 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “None of the examples set out in section 4.1 appear to be compelling 
reasons to adopt biometric technologies.” (EIS) 
 
• “Para 4.2 of the draft guidelines notes that “biometric  systems  can be 
perceived as more intrusive than other systems”. Insofar as they  make  
use of parts of the body  as personal  identifiers, in a way that other 
access and registration systems do not, it is easy to see why civil 
libertarians have claimed  them to be intrusive.” (University of Strathclyde) 
 
39. Section 4 of the guidance gives a short list of examples of a range of  
systems for which the use of biometric technology is recommended by the 
manufacturers.  It explains that these systems do not need to be supported by 
biometric technology and again draws attention to the issue of proportionality. 
 
40. As mentioned in the analysis of the introduction, this list has been included to 
demonstrate some of the potential ways in which biometric technology can be 
deployed and is not to intended to either encourage or discourage its use. 
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41. One respondent, however, commented that although paragraph 4.1 highlights 
that the systems mentioned in the bullet points do not necessarily require 
support from a biometric system, the only alternative suggested is a smartcard 
system. 
 
42. The guidance provides advice on issues that should be considered in relation to 
their deliberations regarding biometric system in schools.  It is not considered 
appropriate to include a comparative analysis of the benefits of various other 
systems.  These are issues to be explored by those most intimately aware of 
the requirements of any potential system and who would ultimately be 
responsible for its implementation.  In these circumstances, that would be an 
education authority.  It is not the intention for any section of this guidance to 
either promote or discourage the use of biometric systems.  
 
43. In light of issues referred to in paragraph 18 as well as those comments 
received on section 4, we will consider the wording of section 4.1 in redrafting 
the guidance to ensure that the purpose of including these examples is 
unambiguous and to ensure that they are not construed as a full set of the 
circumstances in which biometric technologies may be used. 
 
Legislative Context 
 
Section 5. The legal position and the Data Protection Act 1998 
 
Sample Comments: 
 
• “Inverclyde Council considers that the document is very clear and that the 
legislative context has been clearly identified.” (Inverclyde Council) 
 
• “This section is very useful as a guide to the various requirements of the 
legislation to be taken account of when considering the possible 
introduction of biometric technology.” (Renfrewshire Council) 
 
• “The inclusion of guidance on the age by which children are deemed to be 
of sufficient maturity to comprehend the key principles within the Data 
Protection Act, or a test other than age, would be helpful.” (Aberdeenshire 
Council) 
 
• “As the draft guidance states, the seventh data protection principle 
requires that personal information is kept secure against unauthorised or 
unlawful processing, including accidental damage or loss. The recent high 
profile data losses have done much to undermine the confidence in data 
controllers to process securely our personal information. It is imperative 
therefore that all staff be given appropriate guidance and training in any 
new system in particular but also in their responsibilities in terms of data 
protection more generally.” (Information Commissioner’s Office) 
 
44. Section 5 of the draft guidance discusses legislation pertinent to considerations 
when contemplating the introduction of a biometric system within a school.  
Section 6 explains some of the considerations with special regard to the Data 
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Protection Act 1998.  Section 7 considers the implications of other relevant 
legislation.  Responses generally commented on these sections of the 
guidance together. 
 
45. These sections were commented on by several respondents.  Many of these 
comments were supportive, describing this section as “a useful set of issues to 
be considered by local authorities, prior to electing to install a biometric system” 
and that the draft guidance is “helpful in addressing the legislative implications 
and the practical considerations of the introduction of such a system”.  
 
Section 6. The Data Protection Act 1998 
 
46. One respondent pointed out that this section “usefully re-emphasises that any 
decision to be made on the introduction of biometric technology is a matter for 
education authorities to consider” while another respondent expressed support 
for the view of the ICO “that the first, second, fifth and seventh principles of the 
Data Protection Act 1998 are most relevant to the issue of biometric systems 
for children and young people.“ 
 
47. The ICO response states that although it is a “common misconception that all 
processing of personal information must take place on the basis of consent this 
is not the case.  However, fair processing requires that children and parents are 
fully informed about what is being proposed and what this will mean in practical 
terms for the child.”  The ICO also say that “as the draft guidance points out, 
where an opt-out is possible there must be a pre-conceived strategy for dealing 
with those children who, for whatever reason, choose not to use the system”. 
 
48. It should be stressed that education authorities should seek their own legal 
advice on the need for consent.  We agree with the ICO in that good practice 
would require that children and parents are fully informed. 
 
49. The ICO also comment on the draft guidance’s mention of the seventh data 
protection principle of the Data Protection Act 1998.  This “requires that 
personal information is kept secure against unauthorised or unlawful 
processing, including accidental damage or loss.”  Accordance with this 
principal may require “that all staff be given appropriate guidance and training 
in any new system in particular but also in their responsibilities in terms of the 
data protection more generally.”  
 
50. The response from the University of Strathclyde points out that “The guidelines 
don’t directly or clearly address the issue of whether informed consent MUST 
be given to schools, but in allowing for opt-out systems for those who by 
definition have not consented, it implies that consent must be given.”  It goes on 
to say the “guidelines could usefully be more explicit about this and specify any 
circumstances when the introduction of  biometric identification systems – 
indeed any surveillance systems – in school might, if ever, be vetoed or 
reversed.” 
 
51. We will consider whether it is possible to clarify this in the revised guidance in 
light of the advice we received from the Principles Expert Group. 
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52. Another respondent asked specific questions on the content and wording of this 
section of the guidance. In the last bullet point of paragraph 6.2, the respondent 
asked “Who decides which third parties are granted access to the information, 
and are there any controls on which third parties the third parties grant access 
to?” 
 
53. Controls on who can process personal data and under what circumstances are 
set out in the Data Protection Act.  As 6.4 of the draft guidance states, 
“biometric data must be handled in the same way as any other personal data” 
 
54. The circumstances under which personal data may be shared with a third party 
without the consent of the “data subject” are laid out in Schedule 2 of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. This is included in the draft guidance at Appendix A.  In all 
other circumstances, the consent of the “data subject“ is required for any third 
party to be granted access.  Any third party who is granted access to that 
information would then be subject to the same restrictions that the Data 
Protection Act places on that information and could not share it with another 
party unless consent of the “data subject” was granted. 
 
55. We will consider whether this section of the guidance requires more detail on 
the duties of the Data Protection Act in the revised guidance. 
 
Section 7. Other Legislation 
 
56. One respondent commented that the “document provides guidance in respect 
to the Data Protection Act 1998 but also mentions that there are other legal 
considerations that apply to the collection of data e.g. the Human Rights Act 
1998 and the common law of  confidentiality.  The suggestion is that local 
authorities will wish to seek their own legal advice on these matters.  It might 
have been helpful if the consultation document went into this aspect of the law 
in more detail.” 
 
57. We will determine whether more consideration needs to be given in respect of 
other legislation when the guidance is redrafted. 
 
Consideration of the introduction of biometric systems 
 
Section 8. Issues to be carefully considered before electing to put in place a 
biometric system 
 
Sample Responses: 
 
• “The checklist contained in this section is very useful in clarifying if a 
biometric system is required at all.” (East Renfrewshire Council) 
 
• The factors for consideration specified in 8.1 are extremely useful and are 
likely to assist in any decision-making process. (Dundee City Council) 
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58. Section 8 of the draft guidance contains a list of issues which should be 
considered before an authority makes the decision to implement a biometric 
system.  It makes clear that the Schools (Health Promotion and Nutrition) 
(Scotland) Act 2007 does not require the implementation of a biometric system 
and that views of parents and children ought to be sought early in deliberations.  
It also contains a brief explanation of the PIA process. 
 
59. The list of issues to be considered before electing to put a biometric system in 
place was welcomed in several responses.  Other responses suggested 
amendments to the bullet points in section 8.1. 
 
60. One local authority suggested that this “could be further strengthened by the 
inclusion of questions which direct the authority to look in more detail at the 
problems and issues that have caused it to think about biometrics.  It may be 
that a more fundamental problem exists in terms of the structure or organisation 
that needs to be addressed before biometric needs to be considered.  In effect, 
is biometrics the right solution to the right problem?” 
 
61. A criticism which arose in more than one response was that where the  
draft guidance states that there “is a variety of ways in which this can be  
achieved, which do not require a biometric type solution, e.g. smartcards”,  
that smartcards are the only alternative solution which is mentioned.  One 
respondent suggested that it “would be helpful if the final guidance document 
was broadened out to contain an assessment of the perceived advantages  
and disadvantages of card based systems.  It would also be helpful if further 
alternative systems were referred to, again with an assessment of their 
strengths and weaknesses. “ 
 
62. The primary aim of the guidance, as stated in the introduction to the draft 
document, is to “provide education authorities, schools and parent councils with 
some of the basic information they need to know about biometric technology 
and its potential use within schools and some of the issues to be carefully 
considered before electing to put in place a biometric system”.  The focus of the 
document is provision of information regarding biometric systems.  It is for 
education authorities to make the final decision about whether this is the type of 
system which most adequately fits the requirements of an individual school as 
they will have the most intimate knowledge regarding the requirements of any 
potential system.  Given that education authorities will be best placed to know 
these requirements,  it is right that they conduct their own research when 
deciding which system to implement. 
 
63. We will consider whether further alternative systems should be mentioned in 
this section of a redrafted guidance document.  However, as stated in 
paragraph 42, it is not appropriate for an assessment of the comparative 
strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives to be included in a guidance 
document on biometric technologies. 
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Implementation of biometric systems 
Section 9. Pupil and parent consent 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “We believe the question of opt out recognises that a significant number of 
parents and pupils will have sufficient reservations about biometric 
technologies to be resistant to their use.  However it is not clear whether 
Councils will be required to allow “opt out” (EIS) 
 
• “This section contains very sensible advice regarding the need for full 
consultation with both parents and pupils.” (Dundee City Council) 
 
• “The guidance is clear in the information it provides on the need and 
desirability of consulting pupils and parents on this issue” (Aberdeenshire 
Council) 
 
64. Section 9 covers issues concerning consent for consideration when 
implementing a biometric system.  It clarifies the legal aspects of obtaining 
consent with special regard to the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Standards 
in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act 2000, explains the position of the ICO and 
includes a passage in bold text setting out what we consider to be good 
practice. 
 
65. As stated in paragraph 49, concerns were raised in the University of Strathclyde 
response about whether “informed consent MUST be given to schools”.  We 
would recommend that education authorities seek their own legal advice on this 
issue.  As stated previously, we consider that good practice requires that 
parents and pupils are kept informed and involved when contemplating the use 
of a biometric system in a school. 
 
66. Authorities should also consider the importance of allowing for an opt-out 
system for those who do not consent as, other than under specific 
circumstances set out in the Data Protection Act, a child could not be made to 
use a biometric system against his or her will.  This, however, does not imply 
that the consent of all children and parents must be obtained before a biometric 
system is implemented, but that we expect an authority which is considering the 
implementation of a biometric system will inform and consult both pupils and 
parents.  If it is apparent from such a consultation that a significant number of 
parents and pupils do not want a biometric system in their school, the authority 
may wish to reconsider its use. 
 
67. We will consider whether this point requires clarification in the revised 
guidance. 
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Section 10. Security 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “The advice in this section is particularly welcomed, especially in the light 
of several recent press reports of incidents concerning loss of personal 
data.” (Dundee City Council) 
 
• “if school databases are compromised, there is potential for adverse 
effects on children’s future lives.” (No2ID) 
 
• “Recent losses of data and subsequent fall-out must raise concerns re the 
security of any system.” (SSTA) 
 
• “Children and parents must feel confident that their personal information 
will be secure.” (Information Commissioner’s Office) 
 
68. Section 10 deals with issues related to keeping biometric data secure.  It 
emphasises the duties of data controllers under the Data Protection Act, draws 
attention to the functional and technical specifications published by the British 
Educational Communications and Technology Agency (Becta) and 
recommends a review of existing security levels when contemplating the 
implementation of a biometric system. 
 
69. The ICO emphasises the importance of data security in their response pointing 
out that, as the guidance states, “the seventh data protection principal requires 
that personal information is kept secure against unauthorised or unlawful 
processing, including accidental damage or loss.” It recommends that “a record 
is kept of access in terms of who is accessing the system, when, how and why.  
The ICO further recommends that the database is kept local to the school 
operating system.” 
 
70. Concerns about the security of the data were raised in several of the responses 
with more than one respondent citing “recent press reports of incidents 
concerning the loss of personal data.”  This was also raised in the comments 
provided on section 2 which referred to “easily mislaid” CDs and flashdrives. 
 
71. One comment included in the Perth and Kinross Council response suggested 
that the draft guidance “appears to present possibilities rather than actualities: 
insufficient identification and explanation of safeguards provided.” However, in 
response to the question: “Does the guidance effectively explain the Data 
Protection implication of biometric technologies?”  ten contributors to the Perth 
and Kinross response answered “Yes” with only two contributors saying “No”. 
 
72. Conversely, the response to the consultation from a software company which 
manufactures biometric systems states that “[we are] dependent on success, 
and endeavour to ensure that we maintain our reputation.  A breach of security, 
or severe failure of the technology would perhaps fatally disrupt our business.  
We are constantly seeking to introduce new features and technology to add to 
the security of our implementations.”   They also offered an assurance that 
  16
“Back ups are encrypted and can only be accessed when used with secure 
servers that have encrypted licence keys.” 
 
73. The above is, of course, is a statement of the approach of this one particular 
company and does not negate the importance of attention to the seventh data 
protection principle.  This principle is emphasised within this section of the draft 
guidance because it has particular relevance when considering issues of data 
security.  The intention is to emphasise the importance of ensuring that security 
measures are adequate for the introduction of a biometric system.  We will 
consider whether this requires more explicit expression in the revised guidance. 
 
Section 11. Accuracy 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “Biometric enrolment tests performed on behalf of the Home Office 
encountered verification failure rates of 1 in 5 for fingerprint recognition.  
The Shirley McKie case should also give pause for thought.” (No2ID) 
 
• “special attention has to be given where the biometric information 
changes with age.” (Information Commissioner’s Office) 
 
• “We accept that biometric technology would be a huge step towards 
ensuring 100% accuracy in registering pupils but are not aware of any 
problem with the current system which we believe to be very accurate” 
(SSTA) 
 
74. Section 11 seeks to highlight the importance of accuracy when recording 
biometric data to satisfy the requirements of the Data Protection Act.  Within 
this section of the guidance,  the term ‘accuracy’ is intended to refer to the 
veracity of the data and not to the level of detail.  Where the Data Protection Act 
states in Schedule 1, Part 1(4) that “Personal data shall be accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date” it refers to necessity of ensuring that information 
recorded must not be false.  It does not intend any inference regarding the level 
of detail of that information. 
 
75. Some respondents raised concerns regarding the accuracy of the data 
recorded by biometric systems.  Other comments inferred a concern about a 
lack of detail such as comments about “failure rates in fingerprint recognition” 
which would decline as the level of detail in recorded information increases.  A 
response received from a software company puts forward the notion of limited 
accuracy as a virtue of the systems.  This response states that the algorithms 
generated by the biometric systems they produce are accurate “to perhaps 1 in 
30,000.  This allows a high degree of certainty for comparisons within a small 
population such as a school, but no certainty when measured against a wider 
sample base.  This inherent inaccuracy ensures that the data has no value 
outside the organisation in which it has been recorded.” 
 
76. The level of detail contained in the information recorded by a biometric system 
is therefore a key consideration for an authority considering the implementation 
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of a biometric system. The technology should be able to record any information 
with a precision appropriate to the task for which it is to be used.  Rather than a 
simple case for more detail being better, the precision of any system being 
considered should be appropriate to the size of the population intended for use.  
Too little detail could result in failures of the system to successfully fulfil its 
functions, too much detail would render the data more susceptible to security 
concerns. 
 
77. There was no dispute among any commentators that the information recorded 
by a biometric system should be truthful.  Nevertheless, we will consider the 
comments we did receive regarding the precision of information in the 
redrafting of the guidance. 
 
Section 12. Access and use of data 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “Access to the system must be on a need to know basis” (Information 
Commissioner’s Office) 
 
• “The consultation document does not make it clear whether any biometric 
system would be stand-alone in nature, or whether it would interface with 
schools’ existing management information systems” (City of Edinburgh 
Council) 
 
• “I know how technology can be used for good.  I also know that the same 
technology can be used for other reasons.” (Jackie Marshall) 
 
78. Section 12 seeks to explain the need for clear procedures and rules restricting 
access to data, the importance of ensuring applications are self-contained, and 
also outlines some of a data-subject’s rights under the Data Protection Act. 
 
79. The response from the ICO makes the recommendation that “a record is kept of 
access in terms of who is accessing the system, when, how and why.”  
Currently, this section of the draft guidance makes no recommendations about 
recording access.  However, this is certainly consistent with the focus on good 
practice and we will consider inserting advice to this effect when the guidance 
is redrafted.  They also state that “The ICO further recommends that the 
database is kept local to the school operating system.”  
 
80. A comment from the secondary education sector which was included in the 
response from a local authority states that “The consultation document does 
not make it clear whether any biometric system would be stand alone in 
nature”.  However, Paragraph 12.2 of the draft guidance states “Biometrics 
applications should be self-contained systems, whose templates cannot readily 
be used by computers running other fingerprint recognition applications.” 
 
Section 13. Retention 
 
Sample responses: 
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• “data should be securely deleted/destroyed at the time the child 
permanently leaves the school for whatever reason.  Furthermore, when a 
pupil enters secondary school, data collected at a feeder primary should 
not be transferred but new measurements should be taken.” (Information 
Commissioner’s Office) 
 
• “Are there not legal statutes in place determining how long data is kept?” 
(Wester Cleddens Primary School, School Board) 
 
81. Very few respondents commented on this section of the guidance.  This section 
covers the need to develop a retention policy prior to the implementation of a 
biometric system and explains the implications of the Data Protection Act for 
data retention. 
 
82. The ICO’s response welcomes the emphasis placed on the development of a 
justified data retention policy and agrees with the statement in the guidance 
that “as soon as a pupil leaves the school, his/her biometric data would be 
immediately deleted.” 
 
83. The response received from a software company asserts that with the systems 
they have developed “Biometric data is destroyed after the student has left the 
school, ensuring that there is no record that can become accessible in the long 
term.”  This claim cannot, however, be made of biometric systems generally 
and the specifications of any system being considered should be scrutinised 
with regard to data retention and any justified data retention policy which has 
been developed. 
 
84. Another response questioned a quoted section of the Data Protection Act which 
states that “Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be 
kept for any longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.”  
They questioned whether there were “legal statutes in place determining how 
long data is kept.” 
 
85. As the guidance is currently written, the relevant section of the legislation is 
quoted and it is for education authorities to take their own legal advice on how 
to comply with the legislation when formulating their own data retention policy.  
We are aware however, that the law with regard to data retention is of interest 
to data subjects as well as data controllers and we will consider whether a more 
complete statement of the legal requirements of the Act is necessary when the 
guidance is redrafted. 
 
Sections 14, 15 & 16. Data protection policy, taking account of the needs of pupils 
with disabilities and critical risk management 
 
Sample responses: 
 
• “We think that the safeguards outlined in sections 10 (Security), 11 
(Accuracy), 12 (Access and use of data), 13 (Retention), 14 (Data 
protection policy), 15 (Taking account of the needs of pupils with 
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disabilities) and 16 (Critical risk management) are sensible.  If these are 
followed, we see no problem with the use of safe biometric technologies 
for specific purposes.” (Scottish Parent Teacher Council) 
 
• “Back-up systems are a crucial component in enabling data controllers to 
comply with the seventh data protection principle and are of particular 
importance when a service is being accessed at the point of 
authentication in order to avoid undue distress to the service user.” 
(Information Commissioner’s Office) 
 
86. Very few respondents commented directly on sections 14, 15 and 16 of the 
draft guidance.  Where comments were received they were positive.  We do not 
intend therefore to revise these sections. 
 
Part 2: Other issues brought to our attention through the course of the 
consultation 
 
 
87. This part of the report deals with issues which were raised in many of the 
responses but which fall outwith the scope of the consultation.  Though  
the guidance seeks to address the issues which should be considered  
when electing to put in place a biometric system within a school, the 
recommendations which it makes operate within a pre-existing legislative 
framework.  Though the concerns raised through this consultation represent  
an understandable and justified caution surrounding these technologies, we 
consider that through good practice and existing legislation, many of these 
issues can be alleviated.  We, nevertheless, consider it proper to acknowledge 
some of these concerns as many of them raise issues which an authority 
should consider when contemplating the introduction of a biometric system,  
and where possible to address the issues they raise. 
 
88. More than one response mentioned that there were aspects of biometric 
technologies which were considered to be “sinister”.  One respondent stated 
that “There is something quite sinister about palm scanning and fingerprint 
scanning” while another suggested that “The use of biometric technology is not 
something to be opposed per se, but many people feel instinctively that there is 
something sinister about fingerprinting children.” 
 
89. Concerns of this nature appear most frequently among the responses when 
discussing fingerprint scanning devices.  There are less concerns raised in 
discussion of other types of biometric technology.  This should not perhaps be 
surprising since, as another respondent pointed out, “biometrics - especially 
fingerprinting - has, an image traditionally and still  associated with  policing  
and criminal justice.”  This was acknowledged in the response we received 
from a software company, which suggested that “Much of the emotional content 
of this debate revolves around the comparison to the criminal overtone, and the 
fact that a biometric could be stolen as a form of identity theft.” 
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90. The idea of introducing any kind of system into a school which gives the 
impression of criminalising children, even where it does not do so in reality, is 
something which will inevitably cause unease amongst parents.  It is possible 
that this might be less of a concern with biometric systems which work through 
iris recognition or palm vein pattern analysis but, nevertheless, this should 
serve to underline the importance of involving parents and pupils in any 
decision to implement a biometric system.  This will not only give parents and 
pupils the opportunity to voice concerns which may well influence decision 
making but will also give authorities an opportunity to discuss these concerns 
with parents who may find that many of them have been considered.  It is for 
this reason that the draft guidance puts strong emphasis on the importance of 
consultation. 
 
91. Another concern which was brought to our attention through responses to the 
consultation was that “Children and young people need to learn to handle 
money wisely, to know its value and to budget well.”  This concern, however, is 
true of all cashless systems and is not uniquely an issue for biometric 
technologies.  Smart cards and pin number systems are as susceptible to this 
criticism as palm vein pattern recognition systems.  Other reasons in favour of 
the use of cashless systems in schools remain unaffected and authorities 
should consider this issue with regard to their duty to reduce stigma under the 
Schools (Health Promotion and Nutrition) (Scotland) Act 2007. 
 
Next Steps 
 
92. The Principles Expert Group was established to advise the Scottish 
Government on high level principles on identity assurance and privacy for 
public services which are enabled by IT.  Once the principles have been agreed 
we will revise and publish a final version of the guidance on biometric 
technologies in schools.  
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